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I. Executive Summary 
 
Both laypersons and scientists alike are uncomfortable with animal research when it 
causes animals to suffer. The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) has launched 
our Pain & Distress Initiative to work with the scientific community to eliminate 
significant laboratory animal suffering by the year 2020. This goal is consistent with 
public opinion on animal research and with laws, regulations, and guidelines governing 
the conduct of animal research. While eliminating significant animal suffering in the 
laboratory is an ambitious target, what is needed along the way is a focused, urgent effort 
to recognize, alleviate, and prevent such suffering, so that science can progress without 
causing pain and distress to animals.  
 
Polls have begun to document the influence of animal suffering on people's views toward 
animal research. For example, a recent poll (Aldous, Coghlan, and Copley, 1999) found 
that the British public's support for research on mice or monkeys declines 16% to 35% 
(depending on the species and field of research) when the animals are subjected to pain, 
illness, or surgery (factors associated with suffering). Similarly, American psychologists' 
and psychology students' support of animal research declines 43% to 50% (depending on 
the species) when asked to compare research involving caging or confinement and 
research involving pain and death (Plous 1996a, 1996b). The contrast between the 
media's (and public's) responses to two high profile cases of research in the 1980s (Baby 
Fae and the University of Pennsylvania Head Trauma lab) also illustrates the importance 
of the perceived level of animal suffering.  
 
Public concern for research animal suffering has led to passage of two laws regulating 
animal research. Both laws, the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and the Health Research 
Extension Act (HREA), seek to reduce any likely pain and distress experienced by 
research animals. Both seek to do so primarily through the establishment of Institutional 
Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs), which review in-house research proposals 
and periodically assess their facility's animal care and use program. Under the AWA, 
IACUCs are also required to ensure that researchers have searched for alternatives if their 
proposed animal research is likely to cause pain and distress, even if anesthetics and 
analgesics are used to prevent suffering. Despite its regulatory emphasis on alleviating 
pain and distress, the USDA provides little explicit guidance on the topic or on the 
potential impact of specific experimental procedures, such as infecting animals with 
pathogenic organisms, on animal well being.  
 
The USDA issues annual reports that summarize data on the number of animals of 
regulated species used in research, testing, and education. This information is grouped 
under column headings that correspond to the USDA's pain and distress categories:  
• procedures involving little or no pain or distress (Column C)  
• pain or distress alleviated with drugs (Column D)  
• pain or distress not alleviated because pain-relieving drugs would have interfered 
with the research (Column E)  
Nationwide, about 55% of the over one million regulated animals used in research are 
typically reported in Column C, 35% in Column D, and 10% in Column E. In their 
annual reports to the USDA, research institutions are asked to describe any Column E 
procedures (unalleviated pain and distress) and explain why pain relieving-drugs were 
withheld.  
 
The USDA's pain classification system has been criticized on several grounds. The 
current categories are confusing and there is no category for procedures causing pain and 
distress that were partially but not fully alleviated with drugs. The categories do not 
adequately address the issue of levels of pain and distress (the current categories boil 
down to a yes/no dichotomy). There is no definition for "distress" although the USDA is 
now working to produce one. There is no specific guidance to institutions on how to 
complete the annual report forms, nor is there effective USDA oversight of institutional 
decisions on categorization of actual experiments. It is not surprising, then, that an HSUS 
analysis of the annual statistics on animal use for recent reporting years reveals enormous 
(and unexplained) variation from state to state in the reporting of animals used in painful 
procedures without the administration of pain-relieving drugs.  
 
Several foreign countries have pain classification systems that are more straightforward 
and meaningful than the U.S. system. Many of these systems report levels of pain and 
distress as minor, moderate, or severe, or some variation thereof. Recent statistics from 
The Netherlands, Switzerland, and Canada indicate that approximately 30% to 45% of 
research animals experience significant pain and distress, whereas the comparable US 
numbers (Column E) average only about 10%. Similarly, the Canadians report that 13% 
of the animals used in the category of basic research experience moderate to severe pain. 
By contrast, the top fifty National Institutes of Health (NIH) funded non-profit research 
institutions in the US reported less than 1% of animals experiencing pain and distress in 
1996 and 1997. These discrepancies appear to be largely the result of the shortcomings of 
the US reporting system, rather than on differences in the alleviation of pain and distress 
or the lack of figures on non-regulated species in the US (lab-bred mice and rats, as well 
as birds, reptiles, amphibians, and fish).  
 
Pain and distress caused by specific research models and techniques raise serious 
concerns for those in the animal welfare community as well as in the scientific 
community. Yet good estimates of how much animal pain and/or animal distress is 
caused by particular techniques or methods are not yet available. The HSUS has 
compiled a preliminary list of research models and techniques that cause pain and 
distress. Analyses by the USDA and HSUS indicate that the majority of the animals 
reported in Column E are used in various testing procedures, with vaccine testing 
prominent among them. More data are needed to discriminate amongst research models 
and specific techniques in terms of the pain and distress they typically induce. Pain and 
distress may be specific to a particular research model, species, or gender and may affect 
the extent of suffering caused in that particular animal model. Such information is critical 
to informed decision-making by researchers, IACUCs, and others.  
 
Despite the regulatory emphasis on alleviating pain and distress, The HSUS recognizes 
that the systematic reduction of animal pain and distress in the research laboratory is not 
a trivial task, for several reasons. First, there is much conceptual confusion in the use of 
terms such as pain, distress and suffering, and how they relate to one another. Most of the 
relevant literature concentrates on pain, not distress or suffering. Second, animal use in 
the laboratory is quite varied; refinements developed for any one specific procedure do 
not necessarily translate to other procedures. Third, animal pain, distress and suffering 
are not easy to recognize or measure unambiguously and there is considerable 
opportunity for legitimate disagreement among scientists. Sensitive, practical measures to 
gauge levels of distress in common laboratory animal species do not presently exist. For 
the most part, animal care staff rely on ad hoc observations or on relatively insensitive 
measures such as weight loss, to ascertain whether animals are experiencing pain and/or 
distress. Fourth, there is limited published information about animals' experience of pain, 
distress, and suffering caused by typical laboratory procedures. Fifth, lab personnel may 
develop "distancing mechanisms" that help them cope with causing harm to animals but 
which can also lead to people ignoring or overlooking pain or distress that, with more 
attention, could be alleviated or avoided altogether.  
 
If principal investigators, lab personnel, and IACUCs do not currently have the tools to 
document distress objectively, or do not recognize distress caused by disease, toxic 
agents or psychological factors, then it is unlikely that they will take action to alleviate 
such distress when it occurs. It is therefore essential to promote a discussion on when 
distress occurs and to achieve some consensus on those procedures that cause either pain 
or distress. It is not beyond the scope and responsibility of the scientific community to 
determine underlying principles of pain and distress alleviation in animals which can then 
be applied to the varied models and methods.  
 
To help encourage a more systematic approach to pain and distress management, The 
HSUS has launched the Pain and Distress Initiative, which seeks to eliminate all 
significant pain and distress in animal research by the year 2020. The Initiative has four 
main components:  
1. The HSUS has convened a group of experts on pain and distress to draft a 
comprehensive report that addresses key issues, such as the levels of pain and 
distress caused by common research models and techniques.  
2. The HSUS is actively seeking the collaboration of IACUCs and the broader 
scientific community. Through mass mailings to IACUCs, we have begun 
facilitating an exchange of information and policies so that new ideas and 
initiatives, including "best practices" and "humane endpoints," can be 
disseminated quickly.  
3. The HSUS is encouraging the USDA to adopt a new classification system that 
divides pain and distress into none/minor, moderate, and severe categories. Until 
the current USDA classification system is revised, The HSUS will seek to foster 
more consistency and accuracy in how pain and distress are reported.  
4. The HSUS plans to urge both private and government entities to fund studies 
aimed at developing more sensitive and practical measures of animal distress and 
methods by which such distress can be alleviated.  
As part of our efforts to raise the profile of pain and distress issues with IACUCs, The 
HSUS will focus on specific research areas, practices and techniques where relatively 
little attention has been given to animal suffering. Our aim is to seek out new approaches 
to recognizing, measuring, and alleviating animal distress. Also, The HSUS will 
encourage the NIH to issue "best practice" guidelines covering specific techniques.  
The HSUS urges the USDA to adopt new pain and distress categories recommended by a 
committee of representatives of animal research and animal protection organizations. 
Until a new system is in place, The HSUS recommends a number of improvements in the 
current system, including providing IACUCs with clear definitions and examples of 
levels of suffering, pain, distress, stress, and anxiety. The HSUS also recommends that:  
• funding institutions provide support for refinement research  
• the USDA expand regulatory coverage to birds and lab-bred mice and rats, to not 
only formally provide protection to these animals under the AWA, but also to 
gather statistics on pain and distress in these animals  
• the NIH should issue "best practice" and "humane endpoint" guidelines to 
facilitate the pace of innovation in laboratory animal welfare  
The public's support for animal use in biomedical research has declined in recent years. 
The decrease in support is even more evident when the public is questioned about the 
experimental use of animals involving pain and/or distress. Given the public's concern for 
the humane treatment of animals in research and our ethical obligation to the animals 
themselves, there should be greater attention provided to refining techniques, to 
publicizing best practices, and to eliminating animal pain and distress. The HSUS Pain & 
Distress Initiative seeks to encourage these developments, with the goal of eliminating all 
significant animal pain and distress in research by the year 2020. The HSUS commends 
the USDA for initiating its own analysis of pain and distress reporting, and creating a 
proposed set of solutions for reducing animal pain and distress in a recent unpublished 
report.  
 
In the past few years, fortunately, there has been an increase in attention to pain and 
distress issues within science and academe. These activities will lead to improvements for 
both animals and the humans that rely on them. In the end, better animal welfare will lead 
to better science, as pain and distress are eliminated and no longer have the opportunity to 




Animal research has long stimulated concern among members of the public and the 
scientific community alike. While most people recognize, intellectually at least, that 
biomedical scientists are searching for knowledge that will improve the lot of humans 
and animals, the image of somebody deliberately and with careful forethought causing 
harm to an animal in order to produce data that may lead to some future benefit has 
always prompted an uncomfortable reaction outside the laboratory. As Northeastern 
University ethnographer, Arnold Arluke, has demonstrated so well, this discomfort is also 
shared by the scientists who use the animals (cf. Arluke, 1988 & 1989, and Arluke and 
Hafferty, 1996). However, animal research is usually justified by reference to greater 
benefits (new knowledge and medical treatments) over lesser costs (in animal suffering 
and death). One of the costs of animal research is the suffering experienced by the 
animals. This report provides some background to the issue of research animal suffering 
and describes the Pain and Distress Initiative that has been launched by The Humane 
Society of the United States to eliminate significant laboratory animal suffering by the 
year 2020 or sooner.  
 
The goal of eliminating pain and distress in the animal laboratory is one that few, if any, 
people (especially scientists) would argue against, although some might question its 
feasibility. Public opinion surveys indicate strong concern about pain and distress in 
laboratory animals. Perhaps most importantly, the laws, regulations, and guidelines 
governing the conduct of animal research emphasize the need to minimize pain and 
distress. The HSUS initiative seeks to focus these concerns and policies into more urgent 
action to eliminate pain and distress.  
 
While eliminating significant animal suffering in the laboratory is an ambitious target, it 
is certainly within the ingenuity and skills of those who use and care for laboratory 
animals. What is needed is a focused effort to define what is meant by animal pain and 
distress (no trivial task despite its apparent obviousness), to determine how we can best 
tell when an animal is suffering significant pain and distress, to determine what areas of 
research and what techniques cause such pain and distress, and then to look for 
alternatives that will allow science to progress without causing such harms to animals. 
While laboratory animal use has fallen by approximately fifty percent in the last twenty-
five to thirty years (Reduction and Replacement of animals in research) (Rowan, Loew, 
and Weer, 1995), there has been much less progress in the Refinement of animal use 
(Reduction, Replacement, and Refinement are the Three Rs of Russell and Burch 
(1959)).  
 
III. Public Concerns/Attitudes 
 
The public's perception of the levels of suffering experienced by laboratory animals used 
in biomedical research and testing has fueled the controversy over animal 
experimentation. This public concern has been translated into laws and regulations that 
seek to limit laboratory animal suffering, pain and distress (see Section III).  
When queried, members of the general public express concerns over the treatment of 
non-human animals used in scientific research. In general, about 75% of the public 
accepts the use of animals in research while about 65% actually support the practice. 
Support for the use of animals changes according to the type of animal used and area of 
research. For example, in a 1985 poll, 88% accepted the use of rats but only 55% 
accepted the use of dogs. In the same poll, only 12% opposed the use of animals in 
medical research on cancer or diabetes but 27% opposed the use of animals in allergy 
testing (NABR, 1985). In another poll, 60% opposed the use of animals to test cosmetics 
but only 20% of the same sample opposed the use of animals to test medical products 
(Ward, 1990). The public is also very concerned about the treatment of research animals 
and a majority support a strengthening of federal regulations and the development and 
promotion of alternatives that will reduce animal suffering.  
 
A recent poll, commissioned by the British magazine New Scientist, highlights the 
influence of animal suffering on the public's views of animal experimentation. Approval 
of animal research declines substantially when the experiments involve pain, illness, or 
surgery (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Effect of public perceptions of animal pain and 
distress on public support for different types of animal 
research (adapted from Aldhous et al., 1999). Animals 
experience pain, illness, or surgery? 
NO YES 
  Mice Monkey Mice Monkey 
% approval of research to develop a new 
drug to cure leukemia in children  
83 75 65 52 
% approval for research to enable scientists 
to study how the sense of hearing works  
70  56  36  21 
% approval for research to test whether a  
garden insecticide will be harmful to people  
56  43 29  16 
  Mice  Monkeys  
Average % decline in support when  
animals experience pain, illness, or surgery  26%  28% 
 
Although the New Scientist survey was carried out in the United Kingdom, similar 
attitude shifts have been reported in surveys of selected samples of the American public. 
For example, Plous (1996a, 1996b) conducted two surveys of 5,000 randomly selected 
members of the American Psychological Association (APA) and 2,022 psychology 
students randomly sampled from 50 colleges and universities within the United States. 
Both sample groups were presented with twelve different types of psychological research 
which required them to indicate which types of research were justified assuming "all 
research has been institutionally approved and deemed of scientific merit." As Table 2 
shows, the majority of both graduate psychologists and psychology students did not 
support animal research when it caused pain or death.  
 
Table 2. Support (% of sample) for specific research procedures among American 
Psychological Association members and psychology students.  
  APA Members Psychology Students 
Observational Studies 
Primates 96.0%  94.8% 
Dogs  89.4%  91.0% 
Rats  87.3%  91.2% 
Research Involving Caging or Confinement 
Primates 63.0% 57.7% 
Dogs  63.4%  57.7% 
Rats  77.2%  79.6% 
Research Involving Pain and Death 
Primates 17.7% 10.3% 
Dogs  18.8% 9.4% 
Rats  34.0% 29.1% 
 
Public uneasiness about the suffering experienced by laboratory animals is also clearly 
demonstrated by the different public reactions to the following two media events in the 




On October 26, 1984 a twelve-day-old human infant with hypoplastic left heart 
syndrome, who came to be known to the world as "Baby Fae," received a baboon heart 
transplant at Loma Linda University Medical Center. Three weeks later she died of 
kidney failure. The operation unleashed a storm of debate and criticism. While it was 
generally accepted that Baby Fae was unlikely to survive for many weeks without some 
intervention (and even then her chances of long term survival were slim), questions were 
raised about the extent of the hospital's search for a heart from a human infant (although 
such hearts are rare) and about the lack of details on the informed consent process. 
Spokespersons for Loma Linda argued that the procedure was experimental therapy that 
offered Baby Fae her only chance at "long-term" survival. But the available data 
indicated that her chances of surviving for more than six months with the baboon heart 
were not good and several newspaper cartoons picked up on the notion that Baby Fae was 
just another experimental animal.  
 
Although most of the bioethical discussion centered on whether or not Baby Fae was 
inappropriately used in a clinical experiment (as opposed to being provided with 
experimental therapy), some animal activists took the opportunity of all the media 
attention to criticize the use of the baboon as a donor and argued that the animal was 
needlessly killed. This argument was not received with much sympathy by either the 
media or the public. The Boston Herald captured the public rejection of the animal rights 
argument with an editorial cartoon which featured Baby Fae on one side and a group of 
animal rights activists on the other. The captions for the two sides read, "Born with half a 
heart"and "Born with half a brain" respectively.  
 
Head Trauma Laboratory 
 
Over Memorial Day weekend in 1984, members of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) 
broke into a laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania Medical School. They 
vandalized equipment and removed sixty hours of videotapes of head injury research on 
baboons filmed by the research personnel (Fox, 1984). The laboratory used the baboons 
in experiments designed to produce non-impact (e.g. whiplash) damage to the brain and 
spinal chord. The animals were then studied to determine the type and extent of damage 
produced and the effect of the damage on the animals' subsequent behavior. The stolen 
items were delivered to People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) who 
condensed the 60 hours down to a 25-minute videotape that raised questions about 
surgical and animal care standards in the laboratory.  
 
The PETA videotape was widely distributed to the media and was discussed on a variety 
of popular television programs. In July 1985, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
released an interim report that concluded that the laboratory had failed to comply with 
stipulated animal care standards. Margaret Heckler, Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, did not wait for the final report. She immediately suspended 
the research. During this period, both the Washington Post and the New York Times ran 
editorial very critical of the research. The Washington Post went so far as to title its 
editorial "Animal Torture". Criticism of the research by print and electronic media was 
widespread.  
 
These two cases - Baby Fae and the Head Trauma Laboratory - offer illustrative 
contrasts. When animal activists criticized the killing of the baboon in the ultimately 
futile attempt to treat Baby Fae's heart problem, the public and the media regarded the 
criticism as, at best, unfounded and misplaced. By contrast, the condemnation of the head 
trauma experiments by animal activists was echoed and reinforced by the media. The 
critical differences between these two cases that underlie the different public and media 
reactions are most probably the perceived differences in human benefit and animal costs.  
In terms of costs, the suffering of the baboon used as a heart donor for Baby Fae was 
perceived to be minimal or non-existent. In contrast, the baboons used in the head trauma 
research were perceived to be experiencing great suffering, as evidenced by the images 
on the videotape shot by the researchers themselves. In terms of potential benefits, there 
was a direct exchange of the baboon's life so that Baby Fae could live (no matter that the 
attempt failed) while the head trauma research promised only some vaguely identified 
possible benefit sometime in the future (Rowan, Loew, and Weer, 1995).  
 
The public's view of laboratory animal treatment and standards has changed considerably 
since 1948 when a Gallup poll found that four-fifths of the public supported the use of 
dogs in medical research and thought they were well cared for. There is a certain irony in 
this since, in 1948, there were no laws and governmental regulations addressing 
laboratory animal treatment. Today, the laws and regulations governing the use of 
animals in research require significant attention (not always carried through as fully as 
The HSUS considers necessary) to minimizing animal pain and distress yet the public is 
much more equivocal about such animal use.  
 
IV. Legislative Mandate 
 
Early in the 1960s, legislation was introduced into the U.S. Congress to regulate animal 
research. However, it was not until 1966 and a Life Magazine expose of the deplorable 
conditions in the compound of a dog dealer that the U.S. Congress took action and passed 
the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act (Wayman, 1966). This original legislation regulated 
only the acquisition and handling of animals by dealers. It was amended in 1970 (and the 
name changed to the Animal Welfare Act, or the AWA) to include the care of warm-
blooded research animals in research institutions (however, birds and lab-bred rats and 
mice, who account for 90% or more of all laboratory animals, were excluded from 
regulatory oversight by order of the Secretary of Agriculture). The species that are 
covered by the AWA regulations include non-human primates, dogs, cats, rabbits, guinea 
pigs, hamsters, farm animals (when used in biomedical research), and miscellaneous 
other mammalian species.  
 
Two public scandals involving animal research in 1981 and 1984 led to a public clamor 
for more regulation, and two bills were passed by the U.S. Congress in 1985 that 
amended the AWA and that addressed Public Health Service policies on animal research. 
The text of the amended AWA and the associated regulations can be found on the 
Internet at www.aphis.usda.gov/ac/awainfo.html. The law applies to any use of mammals 
and birds in biomedical research, testing, and (post-secondary) education, regardless of 
which government agency or private institution is funding the project. Research facilities 
are not obligated to apply the AWA law or regulations to non -regulated species, nor 
report statistics on the numbers of mice, rats and birds experiencing various levels of 
adverse effects. USDA Policy 11 (see Appendix 1 or go to 
www.aphis.usda.gov/ac/polmanpdf.html) provides guidance on reporting and addressing 
animal pain and distress.  
 
The second bill required the NIH to upgrade its requirements for animal research 
oversight. This bill, the Health Research Extension Act (HREA), mostly addressed 
Congressional reauthorization of the NIH, but one section contains animal welfare 
provisions governing research. These provisions were implemented through revisions in 
the Public Health Service (PHS) Policy on the Humane Care and Use of Laboratory 
Animals. The Policy deals largely with administrative procedures, such as setting up an 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC). The Policy calls upon research 
facilities to follow the provisions in the Institute for Laboratory Animal Resources 
(ILAR) Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals. The ILAR Guide was 
originally drafted (and periodically revised) for the NIH, so it is also known as the NIH 
Guide. (Internet links to the full text of the Guide, the Policy, and the HREA can be 
found at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/documentindex.htm).  
 
The PHS Policy covers all vertebrate species, including rats, mice and birds, and 
therefore fills some of the gaps in AWA oversight. However, the Policy applies only to 
research funded by the PHS/NIH. It does not cover research funded by other sources, nor 
does it typically apply to animals used in commercial testing nor for education. In 
practice, most academic institutions apply the basic principles of the AWA and the PHS 
policy to all of their vertebrate research, not bothering to make distinctions about species 
coverage or the applicability of differing sets of oversight rules. However, some 
institutions, because of the species used or their sources of research funding (e.g. a 
biotech company using only mice and rats), are not subject to the AWA or the PHS 
Policy at all, and are therefore completely unregulated.  
 
A direct result of the 1985 amendments to the AWA and the changes in PHS policy that 
occurred at around the same time was the establishment of the system of IACUCs. These 
are modeled after the human research oversight committees, known as Institutional 
Review Boards or IRBs. IACUCs have been specifically charged with reducing the pain 
and distress that may be experienced by animals used in research as a major focus of their 
activities. IACUCs review protocols submitted by Principal Investigators (PIs), and 
evaluate the proposed standards of care provided to the animals used as subjects in the 
study. IACUCs are also required (by the USDA regulators who oversee the conduct of 
animal research) to ensure that investigators have searched for alternatives if the research 
is likely to cause animal pain and distress, even if anesthetics and analgesics are used to 
prevent any pain and distress (as mandated by Policy 12 - see 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ac/polmanpdf.html).  
 
Investigators do not have to demonstrate that they have considered or looked for 
alternatives if the animal research project is placed in the non-painful category. The 
implicit message is that animal pain and distress is of greater public concern than animal 
death (usually via euthanasia). Despite this regulatory emphasis on alleviating pain and 
distress, the USDA has provided only relatively limited guidance for Policy 11 on the 
topic. Studies involving toxic chemicals or pathogenic organisms are not listed as 
examples of projects that might cause pain and distress. Also, the indications are that the 
use of Policy 11 guidelines in AWA oversight is limited at best.  
 
V. The System of Reporting Research Animal Pain and Distress in the U.S. 
 
Each research facility using regulated animals is required to report annually to the USDA 
the way its animals were used in research, with the numbers of animals placed in 
different categories according to whether or not the animals were considered likely to 
experience pain or distress and whether or not drugs were used to alleviate such pain and 
distress.  
 
The precise wording of each category is as follows:  
 
• Category C: Number of animals upon which teaching, research, 
experiments, or tests were conducted involving no pain, distress or use of 
pain-relieving drugs.  
• Category D: Number of animals upon which experiments, teaching, 
research, surgery, or tests were conducted involving accompanying pain or 
distress to the animals and for which appropriate anesthetic, analgesic or 
tranquilizing drugs were used.  
• Category E: Number of animals upon which teaching, experiments, 
research, surgery, or tests were conducted involving accompanying pain or 
distress to the animals and for which the use of appropriate anesthetic, 
analgesic or tranquilizing drugs would have adversely affected the 
procedures, results or interpretation of the teaching, research, experiments, 
surgery or tests. (An explanation of the procedures producing pain or 
distress in these animals and the reasons such drugs were not used must be 
attached to this report.).  
 
The wording given for each category in Policy 11 is slightly different and is as follows 
(modified to use same form as above):  
 
• Category C: Individual animals that do not experience pain/distress from 
testing procedures.  
• Category D: Individual animals experiencing pain/distress which is 
alleviated with anesthetics, analgesics, sedatives and/or tranquilizers. This 
category includes terminal surgery under anesthesia.  
• Category E: Individual animals in which needed anesthetics, analgesics, 
sedatives, and/or tranquilizers are withheld. For all column E animals, a 
written justification, approved by the IACUC, must be provided, including 
CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) references or other guidelines if 
appropriate.  
 
The actual wording on the Annual Report form provides an interesting legalistic loophole 
which is being exploited by at least one research institution. A careful reading of 
Columns D and E reveals that animals who experience pain and distress, and who do not 
receive drug relief for reasons other than likely interference in the research, do not have a 
classification category. Tulane University, the institution in question, has argued that it 
has a policy of not approving any research project in which drugs could not be used to 
alleviate pain and distress. Therefore, they argue, none of the animals in its research 
projects could be placed in category E. They imply that all animals receive appropriate 
treatment to alleviate significant pain and distress. We have queried this, especially in 
cases where infection with pathogenic organisms has caused the deaths of monkeys. We 
do not believe it is possible, even with the use of drugs (other than permanent general 
anesthesia), to alleviate the distress associated with the animals progress towards death. 
Also, the published reports in the scientific literature do not indicate any such use of 
drugs to alleviate the distress due to the infectious disease.  
 
None of the institutions in Louisiana have reported any animal use in category E since 
1993, which is one of the reasons we first started looking closely at research papers 
coming out of Louisiana. We do not believe that, under current approaches, it would be 
possible to conduct a significant amount of research on regulated species without causing 
some pain and distress that is not alleviated by drugs. Nationwide, 9.1% of the 1.214 
million regulated animals used in 1998 were classified in category E and, in 1997, 8.0% 
of 1.268 million animals. (About 35% are usually placed in Category D and 55% in 
Category C.) The question that remains unanswered is whether these percentages are 
accurate. According to the analysis below, The HSUS believes they are too low.  
 
VI. Critique of the Current Reporting System of Animal Pain and Distress  
 
The current USDA reporting scheme has been criticized on a number of grounds (e.g. 
OTA, 1986).  
 
A. For the first twenty years, there were no explicit definitions for "pain" and 
"distress" and there is still not a definition for "distress", although the USDA is 
now working to produce one.  
 
B. The current pain and distress categories are confusing and there is no category 
for procedures causing pain and distress that are partially, but not fully, alleviated 
by the administration of drugs. In addition, there is no specific guidance on how 
to complete the annual report forms. As a result, institutions interpret the forms in 
their own ways. Thus, one institution might report a protocol in which the animals 
receive anesthesia but experience some post-operative distress as a Category D 
procedure (the animals received drugs) whereas another might interpret the same 
procedure as Category E (the animals experienced distress).  
 
C. For the following reasons, the information reported in the annual reports is far 
from comprehensive, may be unreliable and needs to be interpreted with some 
caution (e.g. Welsh, 1991).  
 
1. Research facilities are not required to disclose their use of lab-bred rats 
and mice, as well as any birds reptiles, amphibians and fish. Total use 
figures for the United States can only be estimated. These groups of 
animals account for an estimated 90% or more of all animal use.The NIH 
reports mouse and rat use voluntarily and, in 1997, these two species 
accounted for 97.4% of the 762,398 animals reported used.  
 
2. The USDA reporting categories of "wild", "farm" and "other" animals 
have changed since 1972 and cannot be used to track trends. The numbers 
are now reported under the categories "farm" and "other."  
 
3. Individual reports to the USDA vary in their thoroughness and 
accuracy, and some institutions may not be included in the annual 
compilation simply because their reports were turned in late. This problem 
has been addressed in recent years and the Annual Reports are now more 
complete and also more accurate.  
 
4. An analysis of the annual statistics on animal use for any reporting year 
reveals enormous (and unexplained) variation from state to state in the 
reporting of animals used in painful procedures without the administration 
of pain-relieving drugs. Table 3 documents the variation among states in 
reporting column E use for 1996. There are some evident differences in 
the types of research performed from state to state however, the variations 
are much more likely to be due to differences in the way the USDA forms 
are interpreted from state to state. 
 
For comparison, the following states reported zero animals or less than 1% of the 
animals in Column E from 1995-1998 (with total usage in parentheses): Alaska 
(300), Arizona (5,000), Hawaii (5,000), Kentucky (500), Louisiana (16,800), 
Maine (800), Mississippi (2,000), Nevada (3,000), Oklahoma (4,300), Oregon 
(4,700), Rhode Island (2,100), South Carolina (6,100), Tennessee (10,900), Utah 
(4,600), Vermont (1,100), Virginia (19,200), West Virginia (1,700), and 
Wyoming (300). It is possible but unlikely that these numbers accurately reflect 
the way that animals are used.  
 
Table 3. USDA data from 1996 on Column E (unalleviated pain or distress) 
use for states using more than 20,000 regulated animals.  
State  % of Animals in Column E State 
% of Animals in 
Column E 
USA  11.2 Missouri 15.7 
California 3.2 Nebraska 10.7 
Delaware 9.3 New Jersey 4.5 
Georgia 13.9 New York 7.9 
Illinois 3.2 North Carolina 8.0 
Indiana 1.7 Ohio 4.9 
Iowa  63.7 Pennsylvania 14.4 
Kansas 40.2 Texas 1.9 
Maryland 6.5 Virginia  0.5 
Massachusetts 3.1 Washington 32.2 
Michigan 2.8 Wisconsin 4.5 
Minnesota 28.9 Federal Agencies 5.8 
 
There are also curious variations within the same state over time. From 1983 to 
1991, Virginia reported an average of 10-30% of the animals used in Column E 
but for 1993, 1995 and 1996, the percentage in Column E was under 1%. 
Arkansas reported little or no use of animals in Column E for a number of years, 
and then in one year, 1993, there was a jump to 56.2%. For 1994, 1995, 1996 and 
1997 the numbers bounced around from 21.3% to 0% to 0% and then back up to 
35.5%.  
 
 For these and other reasons, many commentators have hesitated to draw firm 
conclusions from the USDA figures (e.g., Orlans, 1993).  
 
D. The determination of which category to place a scientific protocol is usually 
done by the principal investigator (PI) under oversight from the IACUC prior to 
the start of the research study. Some institutions do a post-hoc analysis to see if 
their categorization is correct but, based on comments at meetings on IACUC 
function, most do not. A retrospective assessment would provide much more 
reliable numbers for the annual reports, and call greater attention to the 
recognition of pain and distress as it is being experienced by the animals. 
 
Although the USDA publishes only summary statistics on pain and distress, the agency 
gathers considerably more information about column E procedures. Facilities are required 
to submit not only information on the numbers of USDA-regulated species that fall into 
column E, but also are required to describe the procedures themselves and explain why 
pain- or distress-relieving drugs were withheld. The USDA does not disclose this 
additional information in its annual reports but it can be obtained through the Freedom of 
Information Act (FoIA).  
 
According to an analysis by USDA Animal Care staff of the 1998 Category E reports, the 
majority of the animals placed in category E (about 75%) are animals used in studies to 
comply with mandated Federal testing requirements - particularly animal vaccine safety 
and potency (unpublished USDA Report: Use of Animals in Research: A Study of 
Animal Welfare Act 1998 Annual Report Forms, July 1999). Over 50% of all animals 
placed in Category E were used to comply with regulations promulgated under the Virus, 
Serum, Toxin Act (9 CFR) and administered by APHIS, the USDA division that also 
oversees the AWA. Of the remainder, about 6.5% were used in disease studies, 3.3% in 
antibody/serology projects, and 2.0% in pain studies. Approximately 80% of the animals 
subjected to painful and/or distressing procedures were used by industry, with the 
remaining numbers being split fairly evenly between government facilities and 
universities/medical centers. Similar patterns have been documented for column E data 
from 1992 (Stephens et al., 1998).  
 
VII. Approaches by Other Countries to Reporting Pain and Distress  
 
When compared to the percentage of classified painful experiments conducted in foreign 
countries, the United States' numbers for research that causes pain or distress are 
significantly lower (see Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Comparison of reported pain and distress numbers for four countries  
Country (Year) Total Animal Use % Experiencing Moderate to Severe Pain and/or Distress 
Canada (1996) 1,758,416 28.8 
The Netherlands (1994) 770, 888 46.0 
Switzerland (1997)  492, 186 30.2 
United States (1997) 1,267,828 8.0 
 
In Great Britain, the only indication of pain control that is available is the recording of 
anesthesia use. In 1978, 3% of the 5.2 million procedures involved anesthesia for the 
whole procedure (they were terminal) and 14% involved anesthesia for only part of the 
procedure. In 1988, 19% of the 3.5 million procedures involved anesthesia for the whole 
procedure and 17% involved anesthesia for only part of the procedure. It is not clear why 
anesthesia use doubled from 1978 to 1988 although the 1986 Act that revised British 
controls over animal experimentation placed greater emphasis on the control of pain and 
distress (The Alternatives Report, 1990). In 1997, 35.9% of animal procedures used 
anesthesia for some or all of the experiment. By comparison, in the USA, about 35% of 
all animals are placed in Category D (use of drugs to alleviate pain and/or distress, 
including anesthesia)  
 
The Netherlands has made a concerted attempt to classify its research animal use by pain 
category. The 1994 Annual Report on animal experimentation notes that 54% of the 
animals experienced minor discomfort, 26% were likely to experience moderate 
discomfort and 20% were likely to experience severe discomfort. About one fifth of the 
animals in this last category were given medication to alleviate pain but they were still 
considered to be in discomfort (discomfort and distress is not always alleviated by 
analgesics). Examples of procedures that would place animals in the "severe" category 
are prolonged deprivation of food or water, some experimental infections, tumor 
induction, LD50 testing and immunization in the foot pad with complete Freund's 
adjuvant (The Alternatives Report, 1992).  
 
The Canadians provide information on the use of anesthesia by different categories of 
research (see Table 5). The percentages can be compared with the fifty largest (in terms 
of NIH funding received) non-profit research institutions in the United States. The 
Canadians report that 13.25% of the animals used in basic research experienced moderate 
to severe pain. By contrast, the US research institutions reported a total of only 0.6% of 
animals used in 1996 and 0.8% of animals used in 1997 experiencing pain and distress 
(see Appendix II). In 1997, the NIH Annual Report identified only 0.7% of 23,958 
regulated animals in Category E. We do not believe that the differences between Canada 
and the United States are real and suggest that this represents more evidence of 
















B (none) 542 333  52 70 29 58 
C (Min) 709  537  95 56  11 11 
D (Mod/Sev) 414 120 116  147 29 2 
E (Severe) 93 13  5.5 74  0 0.3% 
TOTAL 1,758  1,003  268  348  69  71 
% D  23.6% 12.0% 43.3% 42.3%  42.3%  3.4% 
% E 5.3% 1.3% 2.0%  21.4%  0.0% 0.4% 
% D + E 28.9% 13.3% 45.3% 63.7% 42.3% 3.8% 
Source: 1996 CCAC Animal Use Survey  
 
It could be argued that the Canadian statistics include research done on mice, rats, birds 
and fish and that these animals are likely to experience much more pain and distress than 
the species regulated by the USDA. The Swiss have broken out the data on pain and 
distress by species (see Table 6). A similar classification of the US data is presented in 
Table 7. It does not appear as though the patterns of pain categorization for the different 
species are sufficiently large to account for the large differences in the percentage of 
animals reported to be experiencing pain and distress between the United States and the 
other countries.  
 
Table 6. Swiss Pain Classification Statistics 1997  
Pain / Distress Grade None - Minor Moderate Severe % Severe % Moderate + Severe 
Mice 190.847 67,689  22,913 8.1  32.3 
Rats 101.013 35, 199  8,617  5.9  30.3 
Guinea Pigs 10,610 3,471 1,610 10.3 32.4 
Dogs 1,383 20 9 0.6 14.4 
Pigs 2,116 190 23 1.0 9.1 
Primates 334  77  28 6.4 31.4 
Rabbits 4,660 1,455 72 1.2 24.7 
TOTAL 343,3885 112,351 36,450 7.4 30.2 
Source: Statistik 1997; Tierversuche in der Schweiz; Bundesamt fur Veterinarwesen 






Table 7. United States Pain Classification Statistics 1997  
  Total E % E 
Dogs  75,429 1,671 2.2 
Cats  26,091 378 1.45 
Primates  56,381 840 1.49 
Guinea Pigs 272,797 37,799  13.86 
Hamsters  217,079 46,238 21.30 
Rabbits  309,322 9,866 3.12 
Sheep  33,048 72 0.22 
Pigs  73,995 1,658 2.24 
Other  203,686 2,638 1.30 
TOTAL  1,267,828 101,160 7.98 
Source: 1997 USDA Animal Welfare Report  
 
VIII. Types of Research Causing Pain and Distress 
Pain and distress caused by specific research models and techniques raise serious 
concerns for those in the animal welfare community as well as in the scientific 
community. For example, an animal's pain and/or distress is almost certain to affect 
experimental results in ways that are not necessarily predictable. The control groups are 
unlikely to experience the same degree of discomfort and distress as the experimental 
animals. Therefore, discomfort and distress have the potential to skew research results.  
Good estimates of how much animal pain and/or animal distress is caused by particular 
techniques or methods (with empirical evidence to support the estimates) are not yet 
available. For this very reason, gathering data to discriminate amongst research models 
and specific techniques is essential. Additionally, pain and distress may be specific to a 
particular research model, species, or gender and may affect the extent of suffering 
caused in that particular animal model (e.g., tumor site and burden).  
 
According to the USDA statistics, animal use is split almost evenly between commercial 
and non-commercial users (Welsh, 1991; Newman, 1989) although these analyses leave 
out the federal laboratories which account for somewhere between 15-20% of national 
laboratory animal use. It seems as though the ratio between commercial, non-commercial 
and government laboratories in the USA may be around 45:40:15. In Great Britain, 
commercial laboratories have accounted for around two-thirds of the animal use with 
educational institutions and government laboratories splitting the remainder (Rowan, et 
al., 1995).  
 
Of the 73,822 animals reported in 1992 experiencing pain and distress in testing 
procedures, vaccine potency testing alone accounted for 55%. Guinea pigs and hamsters 
involved in Column E procedures accounted for the majority (95%) of the animals used 
in vaccine potency testing. The remaining animals were involved in the heterogeneous 
category of toxicity or safety tests. Unfortunately, Column E descriptions typically are 
too brief and generalized to permit a more detailed analysis of the procedures involved 
(Stephens, et al., 1998).  
 
Much attention has been focused on the use of animals in the testing of personal care and 
household products although such use probably accounts for much less than one percent 
of the national demand for laboratory animals. In Great Britain, the testing of personal 
care and household products accounted for less than 5,000 animal procedures in 1990, or 
around 0.15% of total animal use. Among commercial organizations, the vast majority of 





A preliminary list of research models/research areas has been compiled (see Table 8) and 
divided into two categories depending on whether the ensuing distress is the result of pain 
or the result of fear, anxiety, discomfort, illness or some other adverse effect. There are 
overlaps, yet the distinction serves to draw attention to the relatively neglected issue of 
anxiety and fear in research animals.  
 
Table 8. Areas of Research and Specific Techniques that Cause Pain-Induced and 
Non-Pain Induced Distress  
SPECIFIC RESEARCH MODELS OR AREAS 
Non-Pain-Induced Distress  
aggression models  
anxiety models (e.g., Vogel conflict-drinking model)  
cancer (tumor burden, cachexia, therapy, carcinogenicity testing)  
depression models (e.g., learned helplessness, forced swimming, infant separation)  
diabetes models  
drug addiction and withdrawal models  
environmental stress models (e.g., hot, cold)  
fear models  
immunological research (e.g., vaccine potency testing)  
infectious disease  
motion sickness models  
nutrition research  
panic models  
pharmacology (some) (e.g., Tumor Necrosis Factor, capsaicin research)  
psychopathology (other than anxiety, fear, depression, etc., mentioned above)  
radiation research  
stress models (psychological)  
toxicology (induced effects)  
transgenic research  
Pain-Induced Distress  
arthritis models  
burn research  
cancer research (tumor pain)  
chronic pain studies (acute pain should not be a problem if IASP* guidelines followed)  
inflammation studies  
experimental surgery  
muricide as a model of aggression, neophobia, etc.  
orthopedic studies  
trauma research  
SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES  
anesthesia after-effects  
antibody production (polyclonal and monoclonal)  
aversive stimuli (e.g. electric shock)  
bleeding techniques (including retro-orbital bleeding)  
Complete Freund's Adjuvant  
control animals denied experimental treatments  
deprivation limits (e.g., water, food, sleep or social partners/experiences)  
dosing techniques (e.g., gavage)  
granuloma techniques  
gut loop studies  
knock-out technology  
surgery sequelae  
CO2 anesthesia for rodents  
*IASP: Report of International Association for the Study of Pain; subcommittee on 
taxonomy.  
 
IX. Recognition and Alleviation of Pain and Distress: Problems and Technical 
Issues  
 
The HSUS recognizes that the systematic reduction of animal pain and distress in the 
research laboratory is obviously not a trivial task. First, there is much conceptual 
confusion in the use of such terms as pain, distress and suffering. Second, animal use in 
the laboratory and classroom is very varied. Nonetheless, while the techniques used in 
biomedical research are certainly numerous, it is certainly not beyond our scope to 
determine underlying principles of pain and distress in animals which can then be applied 
to the varied models and methods. Third, animal pain, distress and suffering are not easy 
to recognize or measure unambiguously and there is considerable opportunity for 




Aversive or distressing stimuli can take a variety of forms. Some are physiological 
stressors (e.g. injury, surgery, disease, starvation and dehydration), some are 
psychological stressors (e.g. situations that induce fear, boredom, anxiety), and some are 
environmental stressors (e.g. restraint, excessive noise, the presence of people or other 
species and chemicals) and some are a mixture of stressors (ILAR, 1992). There are 
difficulties in assessing the severity of resulting adverse states. This, however, is a task 
that must be addressed.  
 
The terms "pain", "distress", "anxiety", "fear" and "suffering" describe experiences, and 
responses to experiences that are, in most cases, unpleasant and hence undesirable. Such 
terms are commonly used in everyday language to describe both human and animal 
experiences. However, the difficulty lies in understanding exactly what is meant when we 
actually use such terms. Dictionary definitions are often circular and unhelpful. For 
example, in the 1967 unabridged Random House Dictionary, pain is defined as both a 
sensation of acute physical hurt or discomfort and as emotional suffering and distress. 
Suffering is then defined as undergoing pain or distress. The Random House and other 
dictionaries appear to view pain, distress, and suffering as synonyms. However, a closer 
analysis reveals that this assumption is not supported (see Table 9 for definitions of 
relevant terms.)  
 
Table 9. Definitions of Pain and Distress Terms  
NOCICEPTION- The process whereby potentially noxious and/or tissue damaging 
stimuli cause special receptors (nociceptors) to fire and send a nerve impulse along the 
nociceptive pathways. Pain perception may occur, but only when such nerve impulses are 
processed in the central nervous system. Pain perception is not a necessary part of 
nociception.  
PAIN - An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or 
potential tissue damage or described in terms of such damage (IASP, 1979). Pain terms 
are very variable and people may talk of acute or chronic pain, or sharp or dull pain, for 
example. Pain is neither solely physical nor psychological, it is both.  
ANXIETY - An emotional state involving increased arousal and alertness prompted by an 
unknown danger that may be present in the immediate environment (Kitchen et al., 
1987).Unlike pain, anxiety is a diffuse sensation that has no specific location in the body. 
Scientists who study anxiety have not developed a code of conduct to limit the extent of 
anxiety a non-human animal may experience and some assume that animals do not 
experience anxiety, although some effective anti-anxiety drugs have been discovered and 
studied in animal models.  
FEAR - An emotional state involving increased arousal and alertness prompted by an 
experienced or known danger present in the immediate environment (Kitchen et al., 
1987).  
DISTRESS - A state in which the organism is unable to escape from acute stressors or 
adapt to an altered external or internal environment. In acute distress, the organism will 
try to escape but in chronic distress, the organism will commonly engage in maladaptive 
(e.g. learned helplessness) behaviors (cf. ILAR, 1992).  
SUFFERING - A highly unpleasant emotional response usually associated with pain 
and/or distress. (Kitchen et al., 1987). The adjective "emotional" stresses the affective 
nature of suffering. Suffering involves a threat to the "person-hood" or self-concept of an 
individual rather than simply to the organic body and is a metaphysical concept. It 
cannot be reduced to "operational" terms and is, thus, not easily incorporated into 
"objective" sciences.  
 
Most of the literature discussion about animal pain and suffering concentrates on pain, 
not suffering. A report from the Netherlands, entitled the "Definitions of Pain, Stress and 
Suffering and the Use of These Concepts in Legislation on Animal Suffering," has almost 
no discussion of suffering itself although the term comes up frequently in the text 
(Voorzanger and de Cock Buning, 1988). The report on animal pain and distress by the 
Institute for Laboratory Animal Resources (ILAR, 1992) defines and discusses pain, 
distress, anxiety, fear and discomfort but deliberately excludes any discussion of animal 
suffering. For the ILAR working party, suffering could not be defined operationally and 
therefore could not be reliably assessed. Like the term "obscenity", people are confident 
they can recognize suffering when they see it, but they cannot define what it is. Pain is 
also a very complex and private phenomenon, but is nevertheless considered easier to 
measure and to ground in the empirical world of biomedical research.  
 
In biomedical research, animals may experience pain, discomfort, anxiety, and fear in 
addition to functional deficits caused by experimental procedures. In most experimental 
protocols, an animal's pain may be treated with anesthesia and analgesics. These 
measures may relieve or even eliminate the experience of pain. To date, however, there 
are no similarly well known methods to alleviate the distress, anxiety, and fear an animal 
is subject to before, during, or after experimental procedures. In some experimental 
protocols, anesthesia or analgesics are thought likely to interfere with the results and are 
therefore not used, leaving the animal with persistent and unrelieved pain. There is both a 
an animal welfare and a scientific need to understand animal distress and fear, and their 




Typically, we resort to observations of non-verbal behavior, such as moaning and crying, 
writhing, wriggling and so on to infer the presence of pain perceptions in animals. Pain 
also has typical physiological and neurophysiological correlates which, unlike the 
phenomenological (or felt) occurrence that is pain, are subject to direct empirical 
investigation. For example, nociceptors (the nerve endings that, when stimulated, are 
associated with pain perceptions) have been found in all mammals and in other 
vertebrates. In addition, direct, percutaneous recordings in human subjects have 
demonstrated that feelings of pain are correlated with activity in the small myelinated (A-
delta) and unmyelinated (C) nerves. Research on anesthetized mammals indicates that 
these same nerve fibers are activated exclusively (or most potently) by stimuli of noxious 
intensity. Such nerve fibers appear to be present in all vertebrates. Similarities between 
humans and animals have also been demonstrated in the central nervous system pathways 
involved in pain perception.  
 
Thus, reasoning from analogy, from neuroanatomy, from neurophysiology, from 
neurochemistry, as well as from behavioral observations, most people conclude that 
animals, or at the very least the warm-blooded vertebrates, probably experience pain that 
is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to that experienced by humans. The USDA 
guidelines on pain in animals state that if one has reason to believe that a stimulus would 




Anxiety and Distress 
 
Pain researchers have paid considerable attention to the use of limited levels of painful 
stimuli in animals. For example, the International Association for the Study of Pain 
(IASP) has set up guidelines in which researchers are urged to design only projects in 
which animals are given the opportunity to terminate any painful stimulus and thus 
control the level of pain they experience (IASP, 1979). Some of the simpler pain research 
protocols (e.g. the tail flick and hot plate tests) involve systems where the animals makes 
the choice to end the pain by moving themselves or their tail away from the stimulus. The 
tail flick and hot plate devices are also fitted with automatic cutoff switches so that, in the 
event the analgesia under study is very effective, the animal will still not suffer any tissue 
damage.  
 
Similarly, one can develop systems that allow animals to "volunteer" for pain research by 
offering them a highly desired food or drink. Such animals are willing to accept some 
painful stimuli in order to gain the reward. However, at the pain tolerance threshold, they 
voluntarily choose not to participate any further. Primates appear to have very similar 
tolerance thresholds to humans. In all of the above cases, the research protocol allows the 
animal to control when the painful stimulus is terminated. There are some studies (e.g. of 
chronic pain) where such refinements are not possible but even here pain researchers 
have tried to ensure that the animals do not endure a significant level of pain (Casey and 
Dubner, 1989).  
 
By contrast, researchers who study anxiety in animals, which is arguably just as, if not 
more distressing to animals, have not developed similar guidelines and approaches. Some 
may not have paid attention to animal anxiety because they do not believe that animals 
can be anxious although they can experience the more "primitive" emotion of fear (e.g. 
Cassano, 1983). It is not exactly clear what the difference might be between fear and 
anxiety. One might fear some definable danger whereas anxiety may refer to that state of 
uneasiness where the threat is undefined and elusive. However, there is at least one 
relatively clearly defined neural substrate that appears to be involved in mediating 
anxious states and this substrate was, interestingly, found to be present in all vertebrates 
but in none of the invertebrates examined. This substrate has come to be known as the 
benzodiazepine receptor because it binds the anxiolytic benzodiazepine drugs such as 
valium with high affinity. It also binds alcohol and the barbiturate drugs which diminish 
feelings of anxiety as well.  
 
Building on investigations of drug binding to the benzodiazepine receptor and its 
subsequent behavioral effects, Gray (1982) has produced a comprehensive theory of 
anxiety in which he argues that "...'human anxiety', or something very like it, exists also 
in animals ...." Gray suggests that many people may find this conclusion hard to accept. 
This is because of the common belief that anxiety is an almost uniquely human state, 
dependent on such complex cognitive capacities as the ability to anticipate future events 
based on past experiences, to form a self image, or to imagine one's own mortality. 
Nevertheless, he argues that the observed effects of such anti-anxiety drugs as alcohol, 
the barbiturates, and the benzodiazepines in animals are so similar to the observed effects 
of these same drugs in humans that it seems more parsimonious to argue that these agents 
act upon a state in animals that is similar to the human state of anxiety.  
 
Research has also identified anxiety-causing compounds that bind to the benzodiazepine 
receptor in the central nervous system. The best known of these are the beta-carbolines 
which, when administered to humans cause intense inner strain and excitation, increased 
blood pressure and pulse, restlessness, increased stress hormone levels in the blood and 
stereotyped rocking motions. One human volunteer experienced such severe anxiety that 
he had to be physically restrained and injected with a benzodiazepine which provided 
relief within five minutes (Dorow et al, 1983). The administration of beta-carbolines to 
primates caused piloerection, struggling in the restraint chair, increased blood pressure 
and pulse, increased stress hormone levels in the blood and increased vocalization and 
urination (Ninan et al., 1983).  
 
The similar reactions of human volunteers and primates to the beta-carbolines does not 
prove that both humans and primates experience the same sort of anxiety but it is hard to 
argue that animal "anxiety" is not a significant cause of animal distress and suffering. 
Gray (1982) has suggested that "anxiety" may have evolved from a biological behavioral 
system - the 'behavioral inhibition system' (BIS). BIS may confer an evolutionary 
advantage by stimulating a state of alertness to novel stimuli in an animal's environment, 
making the animal less likely to rush into danger. Excessive stimulation of the BIS can 
clearly cause animal distress and suffering, as exemplified by a strain of "nervous" 
pointer dogs (Reese, 1979). The distress (immobility, urination and defecation) in the 
nervous pointers caused by the presence of humans could be easily eliminated by 
appropriate drug therapy, suggesting that the problem might have been due to mutations 
in the pathways controlling the "anxiety/fear" response.  
 
While the distribution of the benzodiazepine receptor in vertebrates appears to provide a 
relatively "clean" distinction between "sentient" vertebrates and "non-sentient" 
invertebrates, research over the past decade has produced a host of confounding factors. 
First, there are other benzodiazepine binding sites which have now been shown to be 
present in invertebrates (Lummis, 1990). These "receptors" are found in non-nervous 
tissue and they are different from those found in the central nervous system of 
vertebrates. Second, a variety of other receptors that mediate anxiety and other anxiolytic 
drugs have been identified. For example, cholecystokinin peptides and their receptors 
appear to be involved in mediating anxiety and panic (Derrien et al., 1994). Handley and 
McBlane (1993) describe a number of drugs including the increasingly popular 
anxiolytic, buspirone, that act through 5HT(serotonin)-receptors to mediate "anxiety" in 
both humans and animals. Thus, anxiety cannot be attributed to a single neurochemical 
system in the central nervous system. Nevertheless, it is abundantly clear from the 
pharmacology of anxiety in both animals and humans that anxiety can be a significant 
cause of distress and suffering in animals.  
 
Distress and Suffering 
 
Distress is functionally and physiologically distinct from pain, although the two may 
often interact on a cognitive-emotional level. Distress involves the activation of neural 
pathways in the limbic system of the brain that process emotional response to pain, fear 
and anxiety. Distress itself is used as a qualifying, catch-all term for multiple negative 
states which precludes the opportunity to quantify this subjective state of being. In 
humans, verbal answers to specific questions can, in most circumstances, be provided but 
the human subject may still be concealing his/her internal states (hence the uncertainty of 
lie detector tests). Animals are non-verbal and cannot similarly express and describe their 
feelings. Consequently, distress may be measured only by external standards. Given this 
limitation, and the relatively small degree of attention given to understanding the welfare 
implications of stress in animals, there are currently few methods that are applied in 
identifying and reducing the distress caused to animals in research.  
 
Pain, fear, anxiety, discomfort and distress are all negative subjective states of being, and 
are typically described and grouped together under one larger heading of "suffering". 
"Suffering" is a widely used and abused colloquial term that has been subjected to very 
little careful analysis, even in the case of human suffering. Cassell (1982), one of the few 
to address the biological and psychological roots of human suffering, argues that 
suffering occurs when the integrity of a person (not the body) is perceived to be 
compromised or threatened in some way. (Person-hood is defined in terms of an 
individual's mental life and is distinguished from the organic body). Damage to organic 
tissues can and often does lead to suffering but, for Cassell, it is the psychological 
reaction to such damage that is the key to understanding the idea of suffering.  
The notion that suffering arises from a perceived threat to the integrity of a "person" has 
significant ramifications for any discussion of animal suffering. Animals would, 
according to the above definition, suffer only if they possess to some degree the qualities 
of person-hood. In a later analysis, in which he specifically addresses the issue of animal 
suffering, Cassell (1989) (and more recently Byrne, 1999) argues that only beings with a 
sense of the future (anticipation) and a sense of self are capable of experiencing suffering. 
Some animals do appear to have a sense of self (e.g. chimpanzees and other great apes) 
and a sense of the future or, at least, seem to be able to anticipate and reflect on future 
events. How far such abilities extend through the animal kingdom would necessitate a 
much more detailed analysis than is possible here. One could also argue that only animals 
that are capable of affective (e.g. emotional) responses might be included among the 
category of beings capable of suffering (Damasio, 1994).  
 
It is quite clear that few, if any, people use suffering in the narrower sense articulated 
above - referring only to perceived threats to the "person" rather than simple vigilance to 
protect against threats to the non-reflective organism. Even scientists who object to using 
the term "suffering" when referring to animal distress will, nevertheless, still argue 
vehemently that animals (including invertebrates) are capable of suffering. However, the 
colloquial term "suffering" has such broad meaning that it cannot be used profitably 
(even after careful definition) when trying to assess the severity of aversive stimuli to 




The Relationship Between Pain, Fear, Anxiety, Distress and Suffering 
 
In order to understand the underlying reasons for animal suffering and to alleviate its 
occurrence in laboratory animals, we must first examine its components. In the model 
presented in Figure 1, pain, fear, anxiety and discomfort are all aspects of the external, 
behavioral manifestation of underlying processes. For instance, a painful stimulus applied 
during an experimental procedure, given its intensity, duration and frequency of 
application, may lead to anxiety and fear. The animal comes to expect (predict) the 
arrival of the painful stimuli and therefore develops anxious and fearful reactions to any 
prior stimuli that are linked in time and space to the onset of pain. The sight of the 
hypodermic needle approaching, causing an animal to cringe, is one example. This 
cascade of cognitive-emotional responses can be termed 'distress'.  
 
The cognitive-emotional filter through which an animal perceives its subjective 
experiences of the external world will in turn influence its internal states of being. If the 
animal perceives that the onset of pain is to be expected, perhaps on a daily or hourly 
schedule, it may suffer emotionally from the anticipation or expectation of the pain. In 
this case, the animal's emotional state and behavioral response may extend beyond its 
initial responses to the degree of pain inflicted by the original stimuli. Thus, the negative 
emotional states experienced by the animal may not only contribute to but increase its 
sensitivity to the painful stimuli it anticipates.  
 
The well-studied state of "learned helplessness", which occurs in both human and non-
human animals, illustrates the point that cognitive-emotional suffering may be even more 
intolerable to an animal than the physical infliction of pain. Animals in states of severe 
suffering may display learned helplessness in which they typically show no response or 
attempts to withdraw or protect themselves from mildly painful or harmful stimuli. 
Humans who display learned helplessness are typically individuals who have been 
subjected to various forms of physical and mental or emotional abuse. This gives an idea 
of the perceived events that an animal has experienced to reach the stated of learned 
helplessness.  
 





To lessen the potential slide downward of captive animals' behavioral and 
mental/emotional states into boredom, frustration, depression and finally severe apathy 
(learned helplessness), it is necessary to provide both social and physical environmental 
enrichment (see Wemelsfelder,1999, for a discussion of this topic). Some aspects of 
enrichment involve rewarding and reinforcing social, physical, and other environmental 
stimuli. Promoting well being, however is not quite as simple as providing a "likable" 
experience. If an animal is provided with food and water in a safe environment, why do 
we not consider this necessarily sufficient to maintain a state of well-being (see 
Shepherdson, 1999, for a discussion of this issue)? Experiments indicate that captive 
animals will preferentially work for food rather than eat what is freely available, 
indicating that foraging activity is itself rewarding (contra freeloading: see Young, 1999). 
Play behavior is certainly associated in humans with well being and pleasure, but how 
would we increase the incidence of such behavior in captive animals? In fact, while we 
may think we know play when we see it, behavioral scientists argue endlessly over how 
to define animal play and what such behavior might mean (see Mitchell, 1990).  
 
Anthropologists and sociologists recognize that certain tasks carried out by human beings 
involve psychic costs to those human beings. Working in an animal slaughter plant would 
be very unpleasant for most people. In some cultures, slaughter is conducted by people of 
particular spiritual development and strength (e.g. the schochet in kosher slaughter) that 
permits them to bear the burden of taking the life of a sentient creature. Hunter/gatherer 
societies have rituals that help the hunters cope with the burden or guilt of killing an 
animal. Similarly, the taking of an animal's life in a research project or the infliction of 
pain and suffering on laboratory animals causes burdens that must either be continuously 
confronted or repackaged in certain customs and habits (e.g. the "sacrifice" of 
"numbered" and un-named animals) in order to make the burdens more bearable (Arluke, 
1988 & 1989). Such laboratory conventions and customs allow caring people to do the 
research despite the harm caused to the millions of sentient animals used every year. 
(Lest those of us who are not involved in animal research become too smug, it should be 
noted that eight billion animals are raised and slaughtered in the United States each year, 
under living conditions that range from poor to horrendous, to satisfy the demands of 
90% or more of the public for hamburgers, spare ribs and chicken wings.)  
 
The problem with the development of "distancing mechanisms" is that distance can lead 
to people ignoring or overlooking costs that, with more attention, could be alleviated or 
avoided altogether. Human neonatal surgery is a classic example of the danger of such 
distancing mechanisms. While most humans can report whether or not they feel pain, 
animals cannot and this has led to problems in acknowledging animal pain (see Beynen et 
al., 1987 and Phillips, 1994 for examples). Non-verbal human infants were, until recently, 
also denied the capacity to fully experience pain, confirming the importance of verbal 
report in legitimating pain perception (Anand et al., 1987). According to Daniel Tibboel 
(Personal communication - November, 1998, Zeist), in 1987 it was found that 85% of 
neonatal anesthesiologists agreed that human infants could experience pain but only 5% 
actually delivered pain relief. By 1996, 85% were giving pain relief. Thus, drawing 
attention to the issue of infant pain had a dramatic effect on the delivery of pain relief. It 
is also possible to study pain perception in animals using the same sort of techniques and 
reasoning by analogy as in human infants.  
 
The fact that human neonates could not speak and describe their feelings was probably a 
contributing factor to the overlooking of neonatal pain and suffering. Similarly, The 
HSUS believes that a not insignificant amount of the pain and distress of non-verbal 
laboratory animals is overlooked and/or its severity discounted. There is only one 
research study that looked specifically at this issue (Phillips, 1994) and it confirmed the 
suspicion that animal pain and distress are not addressed as vigorously as they should be.  
 
X. HSUS Pain & Distress Initiative 
 
For the most part, our ability to detect pain, and more importantly, distress, in laboratory 
animals is very limited. We lack good measures and methods for quantifying distress in 
the common laboratory animal species. To address this lack of knowledge and our 
inability to generate objective measures of negative subjective states, and to promote 
laboratory animal welfare, The HSUS has launched a campaign to eliminate pain and 
distress in laboratory animals by the year 2020. It is apparent that those who use and care 
for laboratory animals are already concerned about animal pain and distress. In 
conjunction with IACUCs, they have played a significant role in addressing problems of 
animal pain and distress in the past ten to fifteen years. Nevertheless, The HSUS believes 
that a more systematic approach will hasten achievement of the campaign goal.  
 
The HSUS Pain & Distress Initiative consists of the following four components:  
 
1. Development of a detailed, referenced technical report on animal pain and 
distress: The HSUS has convened an international group of experts including 
laboratory animal veterinarians, animal behaviorists, physiologists, neurologists, 
veterinary anesthesiologists, philosophers and others to develop and author a 
comprehensive report on the subject. The group is chaired by Dr Joy Mench of 
the University of California, Davis and the report is due to be completed this year. 
The group is having particular difficulty in developing guidelines to address the 
likely distress that specific research techniques might cause since the empirical 
data is buried in the literature and not easy to find.  
 
2. The topics that this pain and distress working group will cover in the technical 
report are:  
• Definitions of animal pain, distress, discomfort, anxiety, fear and suffering  
• The biology of pain and distress  
• Recognition of animal pain and distress: current and potential approaches  
• Alleviation of animal pain and distress  
• Housing issues  
• Pain and distress caused by specific techniques and research endpoints  
• Conclusion and recommendations  
• Appendices 
  
3. Outreach to Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCs):  
The HSUS is reaching out to seek the co-operation and collaboration of the 
scientific community--those who will ultimately develop the techniques and 
implement the approaches that will make animal research pain- and distress-free. 
Specifically, The HSUS has invited IACUCs, which already have a statutory 
mandate to minimize pain and distress, to join in the Initiative.  
 
The HSUS has begun facilitating an exchange of information and policies among 
IACUCs so that new ideas and initiatives, including "best practices" and humane 
endpoints (ILAR, 2000), can be disseminated quickly. We have sent five mailings 
to the chairs of the over 1800 IACUCs nationwide through March, 2000. The 
mailings are primarily informational in nature, alerting IACUC chairs to 
upcoming meetings and new publications, as well as informing them about the 
Pain and Distress Initiative. Feedback from IACUC chairs has been minimal, but 
responses from a survey in one of the mailings indicated that over 90% of the 
(few) respondents found the mailings helpful and wanted to continue receiving 
them.  
 
As part of our efforts to raise the profile of pain and distress issues with IACUCs, 
The HSUS will focus on specific research areas, practices, and techniques where 
relatively little attention has been given to animal suffering. Our aim is to seek out 
new approaches to recognizing, measuring, and alleviating animal distress. We 
have commissioned the development of a report on weight loss as an index of 
animal pain or distress and have also begun to research whether CO2, a widely 
used agent for the anesthesia and euthanasia of rats and mice, is aversive and 
causes significant distress to the animals.  
4. Regulatory Aspects  
 
The HSUS supports a proposal to alter pain and distress reporting under the 
Animal Welfare Act that would discriminate between the following levels:  
• no/little pain/distress,  
• moderate pain/distress, and  
• severe pain/distress.  
While waiting for the possible implementation of a new reporting scheme, The 
HSUS seeks to develop some consistency in how pain and distress are currently 
reported (see Section XI).  
 
 
We will encourage the development and issuing of "best practice" guidelines 
covering specific techniques and research areas so that the many different 
IACUCs have some base line guidance for their own decision-making. An 
example of such an initiative is the letter sent out by the Office for the Protection 
from Research Risks at NIH (now renamed as the Office for Laboratory Animal 
Welfare) stating that ascites antibody production in rodents causes distress and 
should be used only if in vitro production of monoclonal antibodies is 
unsuccessful.  
 
5. Financial Support for Research on pain and distress 
One of the problems in the field of pain or distress measurement and elimination 
is that there is virtually no funding to support relevant studies. Clearly there are 
difficulties in encouraging agencies to provide funds for projects that might 
deliberately cause animal distress. However, it should be possible to "piggy-back" 
such assessments onto ongoing studies that are investigating other topics that have 
already been approved. The HSUS plans to lobby both private and government 
entities to make available funds that might be used to develop more sensitive and 
accurate measures of animal distress that are practical in the laboratory and ways 
in which such distress can be alleviated.  
 
Best Practices and Policies 
 
Many institutions and animal facilities have developed policies and guidelines in which 
the pain and distress caused to animals are minimized or alleviated entirely. These 
documents are usually only available in-house (although the world-wide web is making 
some inroads in this regard since more and more internal policy documents can be 
accessed by people outside the institution) and are not disseminated to other institutions 
and laboratories through professional publications. The HSUS plans to promote the 
dissemination of best practices by encouraging institutions to publicize their efforts on 
reducing pain and distress in animals used in research.  
An analysis of some of the policies covering specific techniques indicates that there is 
considerable variation in what is permitted from one institution to another. The HSUS has 
summarized some of the policies on specific techniques and is distributing some of these 
analyses to the IACUCs via our periodic mailings. We have begun the process with an 
analysis of policies on the production of monoclonal antibodies gathered from the World 
Wide Web (see Table 10). The question is, which one of these policies causes less pain 
and distress to the animals, and what can be considered to be a 'best practice'? It is clear 
that more inter-institutional discussion and empirical studies are needed to assist 
scientists in making a determination on this and other policies.  
 
Table 10. Analysis of Policies on the Production of Monoclonal Antibodies  
  Penn State Stanford U Iowa U Minnesota 
Monitoring subj. w/ 
solid tumors Not specified 3/ wk Not specified 3/ wk 
Priming  as low as 0.1 ml pristane Not specified 
0.2 ml max 
pristane 
0.5 ml max 
pristane 
# of taps max 3 taps, last terminal Not specified 
2 taps, last after 
euthanasia Not specified  
Monitoring post 
inoculation  daily 
3/ wk for 1st wk, 
then daily daily  daily 
Replacement fluid 
after ascite harvest  Not specified 
1-2 ml of saline 





anesthesia used for 
new personnel Not specified Not specified 
* Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee policies on the production of 
monoclonal antibodies were retrieved from the World Wide Web. Policies were 
reviewed and organized into a table for the purpose of comparing similarities and 
differences among institutions. The table depicts a variety of policies for monoclonal 
antibody production.  
 
XI. Recommendations and Proposals 
 
The current USDA pain categories (Table 11) have been widely criticized by scientists 
and animal protectionists alike (see Section V of the White Paper). Table 12 presents a 
proposal for a modified system that is a true pain scale similar to those used in other 
countries, such as The Netherlands and Switzerland. This scale has been developed and 
approved by an eight member committee consisting of animal research and animal 
protection organizations. The USDA has yet to take action on the proposal.  
 









C  Minor or None No Maybe  No 
D  Yes or No1 Yes Yes Yes 
E  Yes  No Yes Yes 
1 Animals listed in column D were given pain- or distress-relieving drugs, but these drugs 
may not have been sufficient to relieve all pain and distress throughout the experiment. 
The USDA could implement the new system so that protocols with little or no pain or 
distress (including those where pain and distress are completely alleviated by anesthesia 
and analgesia) could be exempt from alternatives literature searches and full IACUC 
review.  
 
Table 12. The Proposed Reporting Scheme  





I  Minor or None No No No 
II Minor or None  Yes Perhaps Perhaps 
III  Moderate  Yes or No Yes Yes 
IV Severe Yes or No  Yes  Yes 
Until a new pain classification system is implemented, there are a number of ways that 
the USDA could improve the current system, such as:  
 
• increasing facility compliance and oversight of the "requirements" to provide 
descriptions of Column E procedures and explanations for withholding pain and 
distress relief  
• increasing the level of detail in Column E descriptions to enable reviewers to 
create a more detailed classification of experimental procedures  
• creating a mandate for facilities to provide year end totals and summaries of all 
protocols using animals in Column E for examination by USDA inspectors  
• providing IACUCs with clear definitions and examples of levels of suffering, 
pain, distress, stress, and anxiety  
• clearly defining when animals and studies must be classified into Column E  
• clarifying what "pain" and "distress" (especially distress) mean for different 
species under different circumstances  
• providing IACUCs with clear instructions on how to complete the Annual Facility 
Reports  
• expanding the reporting system to include all species that the USDA has 
legislative authority to regulate (mammals and birds), particularly laboratory-bred 
mice and rats  
• closely monitoring research facilities' classification and reporting of animals  
 
In addition to recommendations concerning the reporting system, The HSUS makes the 
following recommendations related to alleviating pain and distress:  
• Journals should adopt a policy of requiring manuscript authors to provide full 
details on the use of pain- and distress-relieving drugs and other treatment 
interventions  
• The HSUS challenges peer-reviewed scientific journals to adopt a "no death as an 
endpoint" policy in order to further progress the implementation of humane 
endpoints into research  
• Funding institutions should provide support for refinement research  
• The NIH should issue "best practice" and "humane endpoint" guidelines to 
facilitate the pace of innovation in laboratory animal welfare  
 
XII. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The public's support for animal use in biomedical research has declined in recent years. 
The decrease in support is even more evident when the public is questioned about the 
experimental use of animals involving pain and/or distress. In this instance, the level of 
public support decreases significantly when harmful research is conducted on primates, 
dogs and cats (Plous, 1998). With the public's interest in the humane treatment of animals 
in laboratories and research, there should be greater attention provided to refining 
techniques, to publicizing best practices, and to eliminating animal pain and distress. The 
HSUS Initiative seeks to encourage methods of refinement and replacement, with the 
goal to eliminate all animal pain and distress in research by the year 2020.  
 
What does the research and speculation about animal pain, suffering and anxiety tell us 
about animal well being? First, it is clear that we have to broaden our concerns about pain 
to include a number of other states, such as anxiety and fear that are capable of producing 
considerable suffering. Second, as suffering is conceived in the discussion in this paper, it 
appears as though it may not be distributed as widely through the animal kingdom as our 
vernacular use of the term might suggest. Damasio (1994), for example, argues that 
suffering arose in creatures that possess sophisticated neurophysiology/neuroanatomy 
capable of large-scale storage (memory) of a multitude of categories for objects and 
events. These memory capabilities are then available for manipulation and creation of 
novel solutions.  
 
In the promotion of well being we have some responsibility not simply to minimize 
animal pain, distress and suffering but also to enrich and enhance the existence of 
animals that we use and keep for human benefit. This is what may lie behind efforts to 
develop environmental enrichment programs for zoo and laboratory animals, and the 
pressure to change minimum standards of animal care into optimal standards. However, if 
our understanding of animal pain, distress and suffering is confused and incomplete, our 
knowledge of what might constitute animal well-being is even more insubstantial.  
The HSUS commends the USDA for initiating its own analysis of pain and distress 
reporting, and developing a proposed set of solutions for reducing animal pain and 
distress in a recent report (unpublished USDA Report: Use of Animals in Research: A 
Study of Animal Welfare Act 1998 Annual Report Forms). The thorough nature of the 
analysis and its concomitant recommendations will help further attention to animal pain 
and distress issues, and hasten the progress of its alleviation.  
 
In the past few years, fortunately, there has been an increase in attention to pain and 
distress issues within science and academe. The result is steady progress in the form of 
experimental data addressing animal distress and well being and an increase in the debate 
about the conceptual issues. These activities will lead to improvements for both animals 
and the humans that rely on them. In the end, better animal welfare will lead to better 
science; unless the pain and distress, unwanted factors, are eliminated, they will always 
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APPENDIX I: USDA Policy 11 on Pain and Distress 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ac/polmanpdf.html 
 
Policy #11 --- Painful/Distressful Procedures --- April 14, 1997  
 
• References: AWA Sections 13(a)(3), 13(a)(7), 13(e)(2, 3) and 9 CFR, Part 2, 
Sections 2.31(d)(1)(i,ii,iii,iv), 2.31(e)(4), 2.33(b)(4) and 9 CFR, Part 3, Section 
3.6(b)(5,6,7)  
• History: Replaces letters dated May 8, 1992, November 7, 1991, November 9, 
1990, and March 1, 1990.  
• Justification: Provides requested guidance. Procedures involving animals will 
avoid or minimize discomfort, distress and/or pain.  
• Policy: A painful procedure is defined as any procedure that would reasonably be 
expected to cause more than slight or momentary pain and/or distress in a human 
being to which that procedure is applied. The Institutional Animal Care and Use 
Committee (IACUC) is responsible for ensuring that investigators have 
appropriately considered alternatives to any procedures that may cause more than 
slight or momentary pain or distress. A written narrative description of the 
methods and sources used to search for alternatives must be provided. Where 
specific testing procedures are required by Federal law, the CFR references or 
other legal guidelines requiring them should be noted.  
• Examples of procedures that can be expected to cause more than momentary or 
slight pain include, but are not limited to, the following:  
o Terminal Surgery is considered a painful procedure which is alleviated by 
anesthesia.  
o Freund's Complete Adjuvant used for antibody production may cause 
results ranging from momentary or slight pain to severe pain depending on 
the product, procedure, and species.  
o Ocular and Skin Irritancy Testing. The dosing procedure itself is generally 
not painful but the reaction caused by the product being tested may cause 
pain.  
 
• Examples of procedures that may cause more than momentary or slight distress 
include, but are not limited to, the following:  
o Food or water deprivation beyond that necessary for normal presurgical 
preparation.  
o Noxious electrical shock that is not immediately escapable.  
o Paralysis or immobility in a conscious animal.  
o Many procedures, including any of those in the lists above, may cause 
both pain and distress. An example of a procedure that can be expected to 
cause more than momentary or slight pain as well as distress would be a 
study involving extensive irradiation.  
o Animals exhibiting signs of pain, discomfort, or distress such as decreased 
appetite/activity level, adverse reactions to touching inoculated areas, open 
sores/necrotic skin lesions, abscesses, lameness, conjunctivitis, corneal 
edema, and photophobia are expected to receive appropriate relief unless 
written scientific justification is provided in the animal activity proposal 
and approved by the IACUC.  
o Research facilities must have a mechanism in place for ensuring that 
animals are reported in the appropriate pain category on the annual report 
(APHIS Form 7023). Individual animals that do not experience 
pain/distress from testing procedures should be reported in column C. 
Individual animals experiencing pain/distress which is alleviated with 
anesthetics, analgesics, sedatives and/or tranquilizers should be reported in 
column D. This category includes terminal surgery under anesthesia. 
Individual animals in which needed anesthetics, analgesics, sedatives, 
and/or tranquilizers are withheld should be reported in column E. For all 
column E animals, a written justification, approved by the IACUC, must 
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*Although The HSUS believes there is significant under-reporting of pain and distress 
(especially distress) by US research institutions, we do not believe this under-reporting to 
be planned or intentional. We believe the lack of adequate data is due to:  
 
1. The inherent difficulties of assessing animal pain and animal distress  
2. The lack of attention to addressing these issues by regulators and the research 
community  
3. The natural tendency to downplay the unpleasant consequences of actions taken 
to produce substantial social benefits (e.g. knowledge, improved health care).  
 
